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NETWORK GOVERNANCE

Network governance for large-scale natural
resource conservation and the challenge of
capture
R Patrick Bixler1*, Dara M Wald2, Laura A Ogden3, Kirsten M Leong4, Erik W Johnston5, and Michele Romolini6
scale natural resource conservation initiatives are increasingly adopting a network governance
Large-
framework to respond to the ecological, social, and political challenges of contemporary environmental
governance. A network approach offers new modes of management that allow resource managers and others
to transcend a single institution, organization, resource, or landscape and engage in conservation that is
multi-species and multi-jurisdictional. However, there are challenges to network governance in large-scale
conservation efforts, which we address by focusing on how special interests can capture networks and shape
the goals, objectives, and outcomes of initiatives. The term “network capture” is used here to describe an
array of strategies that direct the processes and outcomes of large-scale initiatives in ways that advance a
group’s positions, concerns, or economic interests. We outline how new stakeholders emerge from these
management processes, and how the ease of information sharing can blur stakeholder positions and lead to
competing knowledge claims. We conclude by reasserting the benefits of network governance while

acknowledging the unique challenges that networks present.
Front Ecol Environ 2016; 14(3): 165–171, doi: 10.1002/fee.1252

T

he stewardship of large-scale natural resource systems
for multiple purposes, such as water provision, wildlife
protection, recreation, and agriculture, requires the appli-

In a nutshell:
• Successful network governance has the potential to improve
environmental stewardship efforts by promoting inclusive
and equitable partnerships
• The benefits of network governance, which include flexibility and inclusive participation, also present distinct
challenges, such as network capture, shifting stakeholder
boundaries, and competing knowledge claims
• New stakeholders often emerge from the network governance process but often do not fit into traditional stakeholder
categories or hold traditional positions
• Special interests can influence the governance process to
maximize social, political, and economic benefits
• Strategies of network influence include corporate capture,
philanthropic capture, and agency capture
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cation of landscape-level decisions (Aycrigg et al. 2013),
an understanding of ecosystem connectivity (Peters 2008),
and the accommodation of multiple – and often competing
– forms of land use (Parrott and Meyer 2012). Resource-
based conservation efforts must consider the larger picture
and develop landscape-scale strategies across regional and
national boundaries (Locke 2011). Network governance
has responded to this need by offering an approach to
expand “collaborative conservation” into large-scale natural resource management contexts (Peters 2008; Leong
et al. 2011; Locke 2011). As several articles in this Special
Issue illustrate, network governance has emerged as a
means of considering management across multiple geographic and temporal scales (see Panel 1 in Scarlett and
McKinney 2016). For instance, as Bixler et al. (2016)
describe, a network approach in Montana, Alberta, and
British Columbia has provided opportunities for over 100
governmental and non-
governmental organizations to
communicate and coordinate conservation efforts across
private, state/provincial, and federal boundaries, as well as
across the US–Canada border (see also Wyborn and Bixler
2013; Jedd and Bixler 2015). However, as conservation
initiatives have grown in scope, size, and scale, the unique
challenges of scaling-up collaborative conservation efforts
among a broader and more diverse base of participants,
while at the same time managing their multiple and often
competing interests, have become more acute. This paper
examines a heretofore largely neglected barrier to network
governance: that of how d ifferent types of interest groups
may capture this process.
www.frontiersinecology.org
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Non-hierarchical network theory uses the term “apparatus of capture” to describe the ways in which particular
interests can capture and control the central logic governing socio–natural relationships (Deleuze and Guattari
1987). We apply the rationale of apparatus of capture to
extend the traditional notion of agency capture – meaning the transfer of power in public-lands management to
narrow special interests (Culhane 1981) – to newly
emerging models of natural resource governance. Here,
we use the term “capture” to describe the ways that special interests can control the underlying dynamics,
including shaping the processes and the objectives, of
large-
scale natural resource stewardship initiatives. By
extension, we use the term “network capture” as shorthand for an array of strategies that direct the outcomes of
network governance efforts in ways that align with a particular group’s agenda, concerns, and economic or political interests.
Several characteristics of networks make them vulnerable to capture, as we demonstrate throughout this paper.
First, technological advances in online and social media
technologies have greatly enhanced the speed and effectiveness with which information is spread through networks. This proliferation of information has increased the
visibility of competing claims to environmental science
and expertise. Second, the configuration and structure of
participants in network governance are flexible over
time, which allows networks to reorient as functions and
goals change. In traditional multi-stakeholder processes,
stakeholder interests and categories tend to be well
defined to include representatives from resource agencies,
private-
sector interests, environmental organizations,
and so forth (Decker et al. 1996), but stakeholder positions are becoming increasingly more fluid as the boundaries between government, special interests, and
philanthropic efforts become distorted within contemporary environmental policy and management contexts.
Such boundaries tend to be clearly defined in more traditional processes, but in networks their imprecision creates
opportunities for network capture to occur.
Here, we elaborate on the processes of network capture,
and outline three different strategies that are used by special interests. We then discuss particular challenges,
including the “blurring” of stakeholder boundaries and
positions, the ease of information sharing, and contested
claims to technical expertise. We argue that these
dynamics of network capture influence the processes and
outcomes of governance, and should be balanced with
the benefits of networks that are discussed elsewhere in
this Special Issue.
JJ Forms

of capture

The idea of “capture” is not unique to network governance; it has a long history in public land management
policy and politics, with much of the literature focusing
on the phenomenon of “agency capture” (Culhane 1981;
www.frontiersinecology.org
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Davidson and Frickel 2004). More recently, scholars
have identified new forms of capture associated with
neoliberal environmental politics (that is, governing
nature through forms of commodification [Igoe and
Brockington 2007]), as discussed below, which we
describe as “corporate” and “philanthropic” capture.
In the tradition of interest group theory, Culhane
(1981) argued that mining, grazing, and timber groups
control the flow of public goods, thereby transferring the
power of agencies to narrow special interests. Capture,
therefore, came to describe situations where organized
interest groups successfully act to vindicate their goals
through government policy at the expense of the public
interest. The term “agency capture” has been used to
describe the ways in which industry constrains and
dictates regulatory outcomes (Shepard 1975). Agency
capture also occurs when natural resource agencies are
incapable of moving beyond traditional “command and
control” forms of governance (Holling and Meffe 1996),
given that agency partners, sometimes based on past
experience, are often skeptical about the ability of community partners to manage natural resources. Despite
agency efforts to shift toward more participatory
approaches, many current US policies continue to promote the idea of the manager as being the primary t rustee
and owner of a defined set of wildlife, land, and/or
resources (Smith 2011). Agency culture tends to be
conservative and hierarchical (Briggs 2003).
Agency norms, perceptions, and policies often promote
a single jurisdictional authority, a stance that leads to the
delayed adoption of network initiatives and the exclusion
of new and/or diverse network collaborators. This results
in management strategies based on policies and norms
that prevent operational shifts toward more collaborative
approaches to governance (Leong et al. 2011), which is
fundamental to network governance. Moreover, there are
considerable benefits to retaining jurisdictional authority.
The literature on US natural resource agencies suggests
that, as with many bureaucracies, the most successful
agencies (defined in terms of budgets, staffing, and public
support) are those that stake out specific areas of expertise
and defend them (Clarke and McCool 1996; Ogden
2008). Defending boundaries of expertise leads to
situations where agencies can capture, control, and guide
the objectives of networks.
Scholars interested in hybrid forms of environmental
governance (eg Lemos and Agrawal 2006), such as
network governance, are particularly concerned by the
potential of corporate capture in the context of neoliberal
governance (Fletcher 2010). Neoliberal governance
arrangements have increasingly transformed the landscape
of environmental management around the world, through
“private–public partnerships”, private protected areas,
and other market-based resource management strategies
and incentive programs (Heynen et al. 2007; Igoe
and Brockington 2007). Market-
based approaches, or
what political scientists have called the “privatization
© The Ecological Society of America
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Panel 1. Blurring stakeholder boundaries in the Baltimore Urban Stewardship Network
As network governance becomes more common, scientists,
practitioners, and policy makers can benefit from understanding
the different roles that stakeholders play in the network, but
accurate social network analysis requires that researchers
explicitly define “stakeholder”. Although it is possible to analyze
relationships between, for example, individuals and organizations,
it becomes much more challenging when an identified group of
individuals is embedded within an organization or an identified
organization is embedded within another network. It is often left
to the researcher to determine how to place stakeholders into
discrete categories, even though the distinction is not always
clear.
Such was the case in a study of environmental stewardship
organizations in Baltimore, Maryland (Figure 1), conducted by
MR (one of the authors of this paper). The intent was to inventory and survey Baltimore’s stewardship organizations, and then
analyze the resulting data to better understand network roles
and relationships. Stewardship organizations could be any combination of non-profit, state, and private-sector stakeholders working to conduct a wide variety of stewardship activities in their
local neighborhoods and surrounding areas. Both in the inventory and survey analysis stages, we were faced with the question:
what defines an organization? For instance, the City of Baltimore’s
Office of Sustainability, Recreation and Parks Department, and
Department of Public Works all conduct stewardship activities
and have independent relationships with other stewardship
organizations, yet they are also key agencies of the city, which
many survey respondents identified as a partner. Another stakeholder identified by survey respondents was the Community
Greening Resource Network (CGRN), a member-
based net-

work led by the Parks & People Foundation (www.parksandpeople.org). The CGRN is not a stand-alone organization but rather
a network facilitated by staff and members to provide information and tools for stewardship organizations. Including CGRN as
a stakeholder in the network more accurately depicted how
stewardship organizations view their relationships within the
network but at the same time blurred the lines of defining an
organization because CGRN is part of the Parks & People
Foundation, and many of the stewardship organizations are members of CGRN.

of governance”, include the corporate sponsorship of
conservation initiatives, and a singular reliance upon
ecotourism as a strategy for economic and ecological
sustainability (see Igoe and Brockington 2007; Castree
2010). For example, in the mid-
1990s, a network of
grassroots ecotourism businesses, manatee-
monitoring
organizations, and conservation organizations developed
in Gales Point Manatee, Belize, with the goal of spurring
an ecotourism industry that supported local livelihoods.
However, as the network evolved and reconfigured over
the course of 6 years, local and non-
local “elites”
(individuals of superior status) inequitably accumulated
tourism income and misappropriated international grant
monies, which unintentionally instigated a privatized
approach to tourism development (Belsky 1999).
By dismantling state-based regulations, neoliberal forms
of governance set the stage for the growing popularity of
network governance efforts. Both trends are reliant upon
market-based incentives and the decentralization of state
authority over the governance of nature (McCarthy
2006). Cashore (2003) provided an analytic framework
for understanding the ways that governing authority is
captured by an array of non-governmental entities, such
as global forest certification programs, which utilize market incentives to remake social–ecological relations at a

global scale (see also Cashore et al. 2004). Examples of
market-based social change initiatives, such as Fair Trade
coffee and Forest Stewardship Council certifications,
offer strategies that harness market forces to pursue social
and environmental objectives. However, a serious challenge for both certification schemes is to operate in the
conventional market without undermining their original
objectives. Case studies and research have illustrated
that – despite its good intentions – the market’s conventional logic, practices, and dominant actors capture
certification networks (Taylor 2005).
Corporate capture also occurs when the costs of
environmental standards or environmental management
are high as compared with the benefits of compliance or
collaboration (Lemos and Agrawal 2006). Given a lack of
resources and the high costs of management, some networks
are vulnerable to capture by interests that can provide
resources and, in so doing, the influence of 
network
members becomes diminished or is discarded completely.
Some scholars see these trends as leading to “increasing
democratic deficit and higher levels of inequality in the
allocation of environmental resources” (Lemos and Agrawal
2006); in one case, California’s agricultural interests
circumvented international efforts to ban the use of methyl
bromide, an ozone-depleting substance (Gareau 2008).

© The Ecological Society of America

Figure 1. Duncan Street Miracle Garden in Baltimore,
Maryland.

www.frontiersinecology.org
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Panel 2. Competing claims to aquifer knowledge in Texas
Working across boundaries is both a benefit and challenge in
network governance. In the central Texas Hill Country, as it is
locally known, a considerable degree of climate variability is
driving patterns of extended drought that, along with rapid
population growth and land fragmentation, are imperiling
freshwater resources (Banner et al. 2010). In the region,
governance is further complicated by access and allocation
issues associated with how best to meet the water demands of
urban populations, new residential developments, agriculture,
and minimum environmental flows. Competing networks of
organizations, agencies, land developers, and rural water users
have emerged to govern water resources, although this conflict
is affiliated with competing knowledge claims. At stake is the
future of water allocation and distribution from overlapping
aquifer and surface water systems. Although private-
sector
hydrological modeling studies indicate negligible drawdown of
aquifer levels with increased pumping (in many cases to move
water from rural to metropolitan areas), other investigations
not only contradict these findings but also report negative
impacts on surface-water flows (Figure 2). These competing
technical claims, in combination with a fragmented policy and
governance framework (Wagner and Kreuter 2004), have
resulted in a network of governance that is vulnerable to
capture by corporate interests promoting “water sustainability”,

Many network governance initiatives are driven by
investments from charitable organizations. Numerous
philanthropic efforts have undergone a shift in their own
underlying logic to “link up to scale up” the impact of
their investments (Kania and Kramer 2011). This has led
many philanthropic foundations to fund the efforts of
networks, even with the challenges present in measuring
the impacts and outcomes of those efforts (see Bixler
et al. 2016). However, this also creates situations
where networks are vulnerable to philanthropic capture.
Philanthropic capture explains the ways that the funders
of networks and network governance initiatives can
shape the agendas and set the objectives of the networks
(Himmelstein 1997), often overriding the goals of the
network members.
JJ Blurred

boundaries

Boundaries appear prominently in discussions of network
governance. As a management strategy, network governance is valued for its ability to operate across ecological, jurisdictional, and political boundaries (Scarlett
and McKinney 2016). Although social and political
boundaries in environmental governance have been
addressed to some degree (Sternlieb et al. 2013), the
blurring of stakeholder boundaries in network governance
is a major challenge that remains largely underexplored.
Stakeholders – who were once distinguished between
those who affect and those who are affected by a decision or action (Freeman 1984), or more simply between
“polluter” and “victim” (Coase 1960) – now represent
www.frontiersinecology.org

given the underlying scientific uncertainty as to what constitutes
sustainable water use.

Figure 2. Medina River in the Texas Hill Country. Drought
conditions and reduced groundwater levels decrease river
flows.

broad and various positions on an issue. The blurring
of boundaries is illustrated by the debate over renewable
energy development; as low-
carbon wind energy production is balanced against other environmental values
(eg aesthetics, noise pollution, avian and bat conservation), novel network configurations have emerged.
In some places, networks of carbon energy industrialists,
environmentalists, and grassroots activists have joined
forces (Pasqualetti 2011); elsewhere, however, such networks have produced pro-wind and anti-environmental
emergent stakeholders (Jepson et al. 2012).
The shifting and often ambiguous boundaries of stakeholders pose a challenge to network governance initiatives (for an example of this challenge in an urban
environmental stewardship network, see Panel 1).
Positions, both within the actual structure of the network
as well as value positions on an issue, are often hard to
identify, and individual members are part of overlapping
and sometimes conflicting networks.
In part, this blurring of boundaries is driven by ease of
information sharing supported by internet technologies and
social media, which enable multiple and diverse communities of interest to become networked, and to readily acquire
and exchange knowledge relevant to their concerns. This
ease of information sharing has also increased engagement
in environmental decision making and politics. For example, the effect of being connected through social media has
recently been documented as a conservation stakeholder-
building strategy (Kreakie et al. 2015) and – for example
through the use of Twitter – as a science communication
tool (Bombaci et al. 2015). Some have even asserted that
© The Ecological Society of America
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Panel 3. Gladesmen: new environmental subjects
Over a decade ago, LAO (one of the authors of this paper) used
the term “gladesmen” to describe the white rural hunting culture
prevalent in Florida’s Everglades (Figure 3; Simmons and Ogden
1998). At the time, the term was not commonly used by scholars
or by local communities, although LAO felt the term evoked the
centrality of the Everglades to local livelihood strategies and cultural identity (Ogden 2011). Since then, the term has become
ubiquitous, and today there are scores of “gladesmen” webpages,
Facebook pages, blogs, and recreational events.
Notably, the term has also become “politically charged”, as local
hunting and recreational groups now use it to assert their rights
not only to the landscape and but also to inclusion within the
decision-making process. This transformation from a cultural to a
political identity reflects the ways that network activism can
shape network governance initiatives. Restoration initiatives in
the Everglades include many features common to network governance approaches, including the spanning of multiple political
and legal jurisdictional boundaries. Since the early years of restoration planning, several collaborative decision-making organizations have helped shape Everglades restoration planning and programs (Ogden 2008). These organizations have primarily included
groups considered to have a “stake” in restoration outcomes,
such as government agencies, farming and real estate interests,
and environmental non-governmental organizations, but gladesmen and their affiliated organizations were typically excluded

interactions between distant places and people are rapidly
becoming so pervasive and influential that a new social–
ecological sustainability paradigm based on telecoupling
(referring to socioeconomic and environmental interactions over long distances) is needed (Liu et al. 2013).
Although facilitating network governance, internet
technologies and social media that build and maintain
connections also blur stakeholder boundaries through
competing claims to technical expertise. Contemporary environmental politics are driven by the inherent tensions
over the benefits of democratic knowledge on the one
hand and the ongoing disputes concerning scientific
expertise on the other (Fischer 2000). Networks of competing interests consistently counter and challenge the
legitimacy of science-based information concerning, for
instance, air and water quality, water availability, the
evidence for climate change, and the impacts of extractive industries on ecosystem health. This is particularly
acute in contexts of scientific uncertainties (Sarewitz
2004). Panel 2 shows how competing claims to technical
expertise with regard to aquifer levels and recharge rates
in central Texas affect governance.
In southern Florida, decreasing phosphorus levels to 10
parts per billion (ppb) in waters flowing from agricultural
areas into the Everglades remains one of the central and
most-litigated targets for achieving Everglades restoration. Yet many farmers throughout the agricultural areas
affecting the Everglades found these water-quality standards to be “unreasonable”, asserting that 10 ppb is “lower
than the levels in rainfall or in bottled drinking water”
© The Ecological Society of America

from these early restoration-
planning efforts. More recently,
gladesmen have adopted and used network-activism strategies to
compel lead agencies, such as the US Army Corps of Engineers, to
consider their heritage and rights when evaluating the impacts of
restoration projects.

Figure 3. Glen Simmons, foreground, pushing a traditional
Everglades skiff.

(Cattelino in press). Academic and agency scientists
have consistently argued against this claim, but scientific
authority has become delegitimized in the highly contentious anti-agricultural politics of Everglades restoration.
Conflicts such as these can be particularly difficult for
agency partners, who are often responsible for providing
environmental expertise, to respond effectively.
Today, new information technologies and practices
enable different forms of political engagement. As environmental concerns become increasingly politicized, new
“environmental subjects” emerge. These new environmental subjects are individuals and groups that believe
they too have a stake in environmental decision making.
In some cases, new environmental subjects (also termed
“emergent stakeholders”) emerge directly from the governance process and may ultimately transform environmental stewardship efforts. Research in the Everglades
demonstrates that transformation from a cultural to political identity reflects the ways in which network activism
can shape network governance initiatives (Panel 3).
Network governance initiatives in fisheries management
illustrate the rise of emergent stakeholders and the
consequent challenge of capture. For example, at present,
many people believe that they have a stake in fisheries
management, thanks to increased media reach and
advocacy group attention to declining fish populations
worldwide (Gibbs 2007). The exponential rise in the
number of stakeholders currently involved in fisheries
management efforts has almost displaced centralized
management regimes. Gibbs (2007) highlighted the
www.frontiersinecology.org
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importance of “virtual institutions” in both the production
of new environmental subjects and their influence on
fisheries management, a trend exemplified by the pivotal
role and global reach of the Marine Stewardship Council,
a fisheries certification organization, on fisheries practices,
communities, and management. Occasionally network
governance initiatives enable new environmental subjects
to undermine the interests of groups with long-
term
cultural and economic ties to a landscape – in the case of
fisheries, recreational anglers have become powerful
participants in network governance efforts and often
displace the rights of traditional and commercial fishers
(Gibbs 2007). Emergent stakeholders are a part of network
governance, as well as contemporary politics, but at the
same time their participation may complicate stewardship
initiatives.
JJ Conclusion

The benefits of network governance over traditional
models of environmental decision making outweigh the
challenges we describe here. As other contributors to
this Special Issue argue, network governance enables
multiple forms of environmental and organizational
leadership (Imperial et al. 2016); provides a framework
for considering relationships between multiple levels
of governance, cross-
scale linkages, and collaboration
across multiple and overlapping but separate issues
(Bixler et al. 2016); and generally offers a workable
environmental management alternative to challenges
of contemporary environmental governance (Scarlett
and McKinney 2016). A focus on network governance
implies that the managing process is less formalized
and focused on adaptability, with implications on how
environmental management institutions should be designed (Bodin et al. 2006). Through appropriate design
of network governance initiatives, vulnerability to network capture can be acknowledged and addressed by
matching the process of governance to the particular
issue or opportunity. Risk of capture can be mitigated
if a one-size-fits-all approach is avoided and stakeholders
engage in the process of developing the governance
system.
Despite its tendency to lead to network capture, network fluidity remains one of the strengths of network
governance. Mirroring transformations within political
and social movement approaches over the past several
decades, network governance is characterized by decentralized decision making and the rapid sharing of information. As environmental justice advocates have noted,
traditional planning approaches tend to exclude entire
segments of the general public, particularly minority and/
or economically disadvantaged groups, from the decision-
making process (Forester 1989). These excluded groups
typically endure a disproportionately large share of the
negative consequences associated with the implementation of environmental planning and policy decisions
www.frontiersinecology.org
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(Cole and Foster 2001). The flexible nature of network
governance is appealing for many grassroots environmental activists who have felt excluded from mainstream
environmental organizations and traditional governmental processes of decision making, because it offers them “a
voice at the table” and thus a means of providing input
(Schlosberg 1999).
As network governance initiatives continue to expand
and receive greater attention, the challenges of capture in
the ways we outline in this paper need to be carefully considered. As Davies (2012) warned, we must carefully consider “the nature of efficacy of networking in contemporary
political economy”. The challenges of capture serve to
underscore the limitations in both theory and practice of
network governance, and we should continue to ameliorate these challenges to enhance governance outcomes.
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